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Many readers will know that the British 
Government’s periodic assessment  
of research quality in universities now 
involves an assessment of the ‘impact’ of 
this research on the world. In the 2014 
exercise, demonstrations of impact were 
supposed to trace a causal chain from the 
original research to some effect in the 
‘outside world’.
It’s hard to know how the ‘impact’ 
approach would have handled with the 
achievements of Bernard Williams, one  
of the Cambridge philosophers we have 
celebrated this year – in his case with  
a conference in the Autumn of 2016 on 
Williams and the Ancients at Newnham 
College, organised by Nakul Krishna and 
Sophia Connell (pp. 2 & 3). In numerous 
ways, Williams had an impact in the  
public sphere, and his work has profound 
implications for our understanding of 
politics. But it’s hard to see how one could 
trace any of these effects back through  
a simple chain to one or two ideas. 
Another example of a Cambridge 
philosopher who is still a leading public 
figure is Onora O’Neill, who has made 
significant contributions in public life, as 
well as developing a distinctive version  
of Kantian moral philosophy. How exactly 
we should trace the exact connections 
between her work in ethics and her work 
on, say, the Leveson Inquiry, is a difficult 
task, and not obviously the best way  
to think about her achievements. 
Fortunately, this did not bother the 
committee in Norway who awarded her  
the prestigious Holberg Prize earlier this 
year. We congratulate Onora on this 
wonderful achievement. 
One way in which a philosopher can 
clearly and indisputably have impact, 
though, is through their students. Someone 
whose lasting legacy can be measured in 
this way is Casimir Lewy, whose life and 
work we celebrated at a delightful event at 
Trinity College in February (p. 6). The list of 
philosophers Lewy taught in his 30 years in 
Cambridge contains some of the leading 
philosophers of the last 50 years; and it is 
clear that they owed a vast amount to him.
Surely every philosopher wants their 
work to have impact of some kind – the 
only question is what this means. The truth 
of the matter seems to be that it is hard to 
predict or control which ideas have which 
specific effects, both inside and outside  
the academic context. By all accounts, the 
forthcoming assessment exercise (in 2021) 
is likely to take a more nuanced approach 
to impact.
Speaking personally, I do not expect to 
be around in Cambridge in 2021, though. 
Not only is this my last newsletter as Faculty 
Chair (a position I have occupied for five 
years and a bit), it is also my last term at 
Cambridge – I move to take up a job at the 
Onora O’Neill has been named the winner of the 2017 Holberg Prize. Photo: Martin Dijkstra
Central European University in August.  
It’s been an exciting period in the Faculty, 
with many new appointments and 
unprecedented success in acquiring 
research grants. It has been an honour  
to work in this great university, with its  
rich tradition in philosophy, stimulating 
colleagues and wonderful and talented 
students. The Faculty is very fortunate  
to have Rae Langton as my successor  
as Knightbridge Professor and Chair of  
the Faculty from 2017. As readers of  
this newsletter will know, Rae came to 
Cambridge in 2013 after teaching at MIT, 
Edinburgh, Sheffield and Monash. She  
works on ethics, feminism, Kant, philosophy 
of language, metaphysics and many  
other things too. Appointing Rae to the 
Knightbridge Chair – the first woman to  
be appointed to this ancient professorship 
– also gives us the opportunity, we hope,  
to expand and enrich the Faculty by making 
more junior appointments. Watch this space.
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“The legacy of Greece to Western 
philosophy is Western philosophy.” The 
audacious first line – of Bernard Williams’ 
essay, ‘The Legacy of Greek Philosophy’, 
strikes a characteristic note: considered, 
unapologetic, magisterial. And yet, as the 
reader discovers a few sentences in, the 
aphoristic punchiness is not achieved 
through exaggeration. Williams goes on  
to describe, in an account succinct but rich 
in telling detail, the relation between Greek 
and later Western philosophy so that his 
metaphor of a legacy proves to have a 
precision that A.N. Whitehead’s better-
known remark about Western philosophy 
as “a series of footnotes to Plato” lacks. 
Legacies can be squandered, but they can 
also be improved upon, and Williams – a 
modern philosopher through and through 
– never looked to the Greeks as sages. 
Educated at Oxford in the late 1940s  
in what he once described as “the  
heyday of analytic confidence”, Williams 
absorbed an approach to the study of 
Greek philosophical texts informed by 
‘triumphant anachronism’. The view that 
“we should approach the works of Plato  
as though they had appeared in last 
month’s issue of Mind” was, of course, 
theoretically indefensible. Indeed it was 
barely intelligible; for one thing, the works 
of Plato could not have made it past the 
referees. But oddly enough, as Williams  
was the first to admit, the method worked, 
producing a generation of philologically 
and philosophically acute scholars  
who refused to patronise the texts and  
took them seriously as articulating 
arguments that we might accept or  
reject on their merits.
In the 1970s, Williams’ thinking about  
the Greeks underwent a deep shift, in part 
the consequence of his own, increasingly 
pessimistic, ideas about what philosophy 
could do, in part the consequence of his 
growing fascination with Nietzsche. The 
Greeks, Nietzsche had more than once 
remarked, “were superficial – out of 
profundity”. Nietzsche was not talking  
of the respectable philosophical Greeks 
who took their cue from Socrates and  
took virtue and wisdom as the way to 
happiness. The Greeks he most respected 
were the characters and creators of tragedy, 
history and rhetoric, even the teachers of 
rhetoric Socrates maligned as ‘sophists’.  
For Nietzsche, as Williams put it, the 
modern world was lamentably Socratic  
in its “heightened reflectiveness, self-
consciousness, and inwardness”, and  
these things, Nietzsche had thought,  
“it was ... one of the charms, and indeed the 
power, of the Greeks to have done without.”
When Williams was invited in the early 
1990s to deliver the prestigious Sather 
Lectures at the University of California, 
Berkeley – later published as Shame and 
Necessity (1993) –  he had a good deal to 
say about the Greek philosopher. But his 
real interest was in overturning, with every 
argumentative and rhetorical resource 
available to him, a certain ‘Whiggish’ 
interpretation of history. This interpretation 
saw the modern world and its philosophy 
as equipped with a set of notions – 
morality, responsibility and ‘the will’ among 
others – that the Greeks had lacked and 
been the worse off for lacking. 
Williams denied this: the Greeks had all 
the notions they, or we, needed. A simpler 
philosophy of action, using only the terms 
available to Homer, could make all the 
necessary distinctions without muddying 
the waters with concerns derived from  
that unfortunate institution, morality  
(or, as Williams preferred to say, ‘the  
morality system’). But one couldn’t  
regain the pre-Socratic Greeks’ profound 
superficiality just by trying. “That is not 
possible for us,” wrote Williams, “after so 
much history: any such attitude for us will 
be a different and more sophisticated thing, 
and it will represent an achievement.”
A philosopher writing in the late 20th 
century, Williams assured his Berkeley 
audiences that he did not wish to ally 
himself “with those who suspect that the 
closing scenes of the Eumenides already 
display a dangerous weakening toward 
liberalism.” (This is the scene where the 
frenzied Furies, figures of vengeance,  
are transformed into guardians of justice, 
with courts and procedures to go with  
their new role.) The point wasn’t to do  
away with the achievements of the  
modern world in thought and politics  
in exchange for some slave-owning, 
toga-wearing, olive-eating and largely 
invented vision of a classical past. The  
point was to give us and our institutions  
a more truthful self-understanding, and 
learning to see the Greeks aright might  
be one way to do that. 
In his writings in the 1990s, Williams 
came to articulate with a startling 
directness the pessimistic reflections 
towards which he had been reaching in  
all his previous work: “human beings are to 
some degree a mess”. Given our history 
– our natural, evolutionary, history as well  
as that of the last two or three thousand 
years of civilization –  “no form of life is  
likely to prove entirely satisfactory, either 
individually or socially”. We will always want 
more things than we can have, and this is 
Togas and Olives
Nakul Krishna
Detail from The Remorse of Orestes by William-Adolphe Bouguereau.  Photo: Wikimedia Commons 
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not just a contingent – if unfortunate – 
truth about the world, but a necessary  
truth about beings like us, cursed with 
desires and aspirations that cannot by  
their nature be jointly satisfied. And to  
the extent that we might simplify our 
desires so that they can be satisfied, our 
new existence may not be one we can 
recognise as an improvement.
Life, in other words, will always be a 
disappointment to us. This is a tragic  
insight, and Williams’ writings on Greek 
tragedy – in particular, the tragedies of 
Sophocles –  took this to be their most 
obvious achievement: “to offer a necessary 
supplement and a suitable limitation to the 
tireless aim of moral philosophy to make 
the world safe for well-disposed people.” 
The world cannot be made altogether  
safe, or altogether undisappointing, for  
the kinds of creatures we are.
If this thought is unappealing to a 
rational mind, Williams thought, so much 
for the worse for rationalism. Where private 
life was concerned, Williams had written in 
an essay from the late 1970s (‘Conflicts of 
Values’), most of us can survive a certain 
level of ‘unresolved conflict’. But public  
life, with its demands of explicitness, 
transparency, and accountability, is harder 
to square with this level of conflict. 
Still, no viable politics should try to 
resolve all conflict, because unresolved 
conflict is something we cannot do  
without in a life with any ‘density or 
conviction’. It is, he thought, essential  
to any worthwhile life, and a worthwhile  
life – as he wrote in an astonishing remark 
that rewards re-reading – is the “kind of  
life which human beings lack unless they 
feel more than they can say, and grasp 
more than they can explain.”
But even if the world cannot be made 
altogether safe, there are ways to arrange  
it so that it is safer than the one Greeks 
inhabited – not just vaccinations and 
seatbelts, but a set of political institutions 
designed to insulate our lives from the worst 
kinds of rotten luck. In one of his more 
hopeful reflections – hopeful only by his 
own pessimistic standards – Williams noted 
that modern capitalist societies had nothing 
to be smug about when they reflected  
on the practices of slave-owning societies  
in the past. Just like them, he wrote, “we 
recognise arbitrary and brutal ways in which 
people are handled by society.... We have 
the intellectual resources to regard ... the 
systems that allow these things ... as unjust, 
but are uncertain whether to do so, ... partly 
because we have no settled opinion on ... 
how far the existence of a worthwhile life  
for some people involves the imposition  
of suffering on others.”
The ‘we’ is deliberately provocative. It is 
clear enough what the right-on thing to say 
is, but to what extent are those convictions 
reflected in the lives and lifestyles of those 
of us living, and sometimes flourishing, 
under capitalism? What would it be like  
for us to try to live in ways that imposed 
suffering on no one? Here, as always, there 
is the problem to which all of Williams’ work 
is directed, “of distinguishing what we think 
from what we think that we think.” And 
having done that, there is the task of 
designing and sustaining institutions 
adequate to our ethical commitments. 
In September last year, I had the  
occasion to assist Dr Sophia Connell in the 
organisation of a conference at Newnham 
College that brought philosophers and 
classicists together to discuss themes in 
Williams’ work that concerned the ancient 
world. As Professor M.M. McCabe observed 
in her keynote address, a great deal of 
Williams’ scholarship is surprisingly elusive. 
The superficial provocation is rarely the 
point, and even the most straightforward  
of his claims can, with a little prodding, 
reveal hidden depths. His work continues  
to provoke, to shock, and to illuminate the 
dark corners of modernity and its classical 
past. As he put it in the closing lines of 
Shame and Necessity, he hoped above all 
that “we might move beyond marvelling  
at [the things that have survived from 
antiquity], to putting them, or bits of them, 
to modern uses.” That task continues.
Nakul Krishna is a lecturer in  
the Faculty.
Wikipedia event on  
women philosophers
Wikipedia is disproportionally written by and about men, with 
only around 17% of notable profiles of women. Entries for women 
philosophers are often mere ‘stubs’, a few lines of information 
lacking biographical or philosophical detail.
As part of International Women’s Day the Casimir Lewy  
Library hosted a Wikipedia edit-a-thon in partnership with the 
Cambridge Women in Philosophy group to help improve the 
representation of women philosophers and their ideas on the site. 
An enthusiastic group of students spent a productive afternoon 
adding new entries on women philosophers and improving 
existing ones. Anyone can edit Wikipedia and help to address  
the gender balance and improve the coverage of eminent 
women in philosophy.
CFI Launch event
The Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence  
(CFI) was formally launched on 19 October 2016 with  
an event in the David Attenborough Building in 
Cambridge. CFI brings together four of the world’s 
leading universities (Cambridge, Oxford, Berkeley and 
Imperial College, London) to explore the implications  
of AI for human civilisation. 
Talks were given by Professor Stephen Hawking; 
Newnham alumna and AI pioneer Professor Maggie 
Boden; the Academic Director of the Centre, Bertrand 
Russell Professor of Philosophy, Huw Price; Zoubin 
Ghahramani, Chris Abell, and the Director of the 
Leverhulme Trust, Professor Gordon Marshall.
Bernard Williams.  
Photo courtesy of Patricia Williams 
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Against marriage: an egalitarian  
defence of the marriage-free state
Clare Chambers
Feminists have long criticised the  
institution of marriage. Historically, it  
has been a fundamental site of women’s 
oppression, with married women having  
few independent rights in law. Currently,  
it is associated with the gendered division  
of labour, with women taking on the lion’s 
share of domestic and caring work and 
being paid less than men for work outside 
the home. The white wedding is replete with 
sexist imagery: the father ‘giving away’ the 
bride; the white dress symbolising the bride’s 
virginity (and emphasising the importance 
of her appearance); the vows to obey the 
husband; the minister telling the husband: 
“You may now kiss the bride” (rather than the 
bride herself giving permission, or indeed 
initiating or at least equally participating in 
the act of kissing); the reception at which, 
traditionally, all the speeches are given by 
men; the wife surrendering her own name 
and taking her husband’s.
Despite decades of feminist criticism  
the institution resolutely endures – though 
not without change. The most significant 
change has been in the introduction of 
same-sex marriages and civil unions in 
countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, the Nordic countries, Ireland, Spain, 
France, Canada and the USA. In the USA in 
particular, same-sex marriage has recently 
been a fiercely contested and central part  
of political debate, with many states 
alternately allowing and forbidding it as the 
issue passed between the legislature, the 
judiciary, and the electorate, until the issue 
was settled at the federal level with a 
Supreme Court ruling.
If marriage is to exist as a state-recognised 
institution then it must, as a requirement of 
equality, be available to same-sex couples. 
There is a great deal to celebrate in recent 
moves to widen marriage, and it is hard not 
to be touched by the scenes of same-sex 
couples rejoicing as they are finally allowed 
to marry. But even these welcome reforms 
do not go far enough. In my latest book I 
advocate the end of marriage as a state-
recognised institution.
As the title of the book indicates, Against 
Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the 
Marriage-Free State presents both a negative 
and a positive thesis. The negative thesis  
is a critique of the institution of marriage as 
it is traditionally understood, and a rejection 
of the state recognition of marriage in any 
form. The positive thesis is an outline of a 
state in which personal relationships are 
regulated, the vulnerable are protected,  
and justice is furthered, all without the  
state recognition of marriage or any similar 
alternative. I call this ideal of a state which 
does not recognise marriage ‘the marriage-
free state’. 
In the marriage-free state the term 
‘marriage’ would have no legal significance. 
The state would not regulate the term,  
nor would it provide laws that dealt 
specifically with the creation and dissolution 
of marriages. ‘Marriage’ would be a term  
like ‘friendship’. It would have meaning, and 
typically be used to denote a certain sort of 
relationship, but that meaning would not  
be a matter of legal ruling. Like friendship, 
marriage would mean different things to 
different people. Sometimes a friend is a 
person with whom we share our lives, 
meeting regularly and sharing social 
situations, attending events together, 
holidaying together, discussing all areas  
of life. But it is also perfectly acceptable  
and meaningful to use the term to denote 
someone with whom one has only a virtual 
connection, such as through social media. 
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Similarly, for some people marriage would 
be much as it is now: a formal, solemnified 
ceremony bringing with it weighty social 
meaning and norms. For others, marriage 
might be used casually, to denote a fleeting 
commitment or even a commitment to an 
object or a cause. As with friendship, not all 
uses of the word ‘marriage’ would succeed 
in achieving uptake. They would not all 
make sense to others. But their use would 
not conflict with any legal definition.
Weddings, then, would still take place in 
the marriage-free state. No state ceremony 
or registration would be involved, but 
weddings could persist nonetheless.  
The marriage-free state would place no 
regulations on where weddings could  
take place, since they would not be legal 
ceremonies: weddings could take place at 
home, on a mountaintop, in a swimming 
pool. But weddings could also take place 
exactly as they do now, in a marriage 
regime: in churches, temples, synagogues 
and mosques; in stately homes and hotels; 
with receptions and dresses and 
bridesmaids and speeches.
So the marriage-free state would still 
contain weddings. It would also contain 
monogamous, committed sexual 
partnerships, some of which would be 
called marriages by their participants and 
some of which would not. People would 
introduce each other as husband, wife, 
spouse, partner, lover, friend, just as they 
pleased. People could wear rings or not, 
change their names or not, call themselves 
Mrs or Miss or Ms. Official documentation 
would not distinguish between these titles 
other than as needed to respect people’s 
important interests, such as when a doctor 
might ask how a patient preferred to be 
addressed while receiving treatment. But 
there would be nothing illegitimate in a 
person using marital or non-marital titles.
The marriage-free state would not 
recognise or endorse marriages, but nor 
would it leave relationships and family 
unregulated. In existing marriage regimes 
there is and must be regulation: to protect 
vulnerable parties, to settle matters and 
disputes that must be determinate in  
law, and to ensure justice. Regulation of 
personal relationships in the marriage-free 
state aims to ensure equality: between 
people within relationships, and also 
between people regardless of whether  
or not they are in a relationship of any 
particular kind.
As already noted, marriage has always 
been deeply gendered, a lynchpin of 
patriarchal societies and relations, and thus 
the subject of feminist criticism. But even if 
marriage is reformed so as to be formally 
equal, regardless or sex or sexuality, it still 
retains inequality. Marriage is at heart a 
symbolic institution, one that transmits  
and endorses particular social meanings 
about the nature of love and family and the 
source of value. These have traditionally 
been sexist and heterosexist, and for many 
people these traditional meanings continue 
to taint the institution, leading them to  
seek alternatives such as civil partnership  
in order to achieve legal protection. For 
example, the Equal Civil Partnerships 
campaign calls for different-sex couples to 
be able to access civil partnerships on the 
same basis as same-sex couples.
These concerns about marriage’s 
symbolic element must be taken very 
seriously, as Against Marriage argues in  
much greater detail. Still, some may argue 
that the meaning of marriage will eventually 
shift along with its legal implications. What 
would be wrong with state recognition  
of marriage then? The answer is that no 
amount of reform can remove another 
fundamental inequality of marriage, which  
is between married and unmarried people 
and their families. State-recognised marriage 
affords legal protection, official approbation, 
or both to those in certain forms of 
relationship and families. In doing so it 
makes controversial and divisive claims 
about value, and sets up structural 
inequalities based on relationship type.  
It is unjust for people to be given different 
legal status regarding matters such as 
immigration, taxation, property ownership, 
protection for caring work, insurance, 
pension provision, and next-of-kinship 
depending on their ability and willingness 
to participate in a particular family form, and 
to sanctify that relationship with a ceremony 
that has substantive and controversial 
symbolic meaning. And it is particularly 
problematic to tie children’s life chances to 
the marital status of their parents.
Instead, the state should provide  
default regulation to those participating  
in relationship practices, regardless of 
whether they have sought a special status 
for their relationship. The sorts of practices 
that are in need of regulation to protect  
the vulnerable and ensure justice include 
but are not limited to parenting, property-
ownership, taxation, cohabitation, and 
separation. The most basic idea of the 
marriage-free state and the simplest way  
to understand it is this: the marriage-free 
state starts by working out what would be 
the just way to regulate relationships 
between unmarried people, and then 
applies that regulation to everyone. 
Of course, I have my own views about  
the best form of regulation in many areas  
of family life and personal relationships. By 
and large, though, I do not defend them in 
Against Marriage. The aim of the book is not 
to settle the question of the ideal content of 
regulation, a task that would merit several 
volumes in and of itself, but rather to 
propose a form or structure of regulation. 
One way to think about the structure of the 
marriage-free state without being distracted 
by dilemmas of regulatory content is to ask 
yourself the following questions:
What do I think is the ideal, just way of 
regulating unmarried people now, in a 
marriage regime? What laws should 
apply to unmarried parents, or unmarried 
cohabitants, or unmarried migrants, or 
unmarried property-owners? What 
would it be like if those ideal regulations 
were applied to everyone, regardless of 
marital status?
The society you envisage will be your ideal 
form of the marriage-free state. The most 
fundamental aim of Against Marriage is to 
convince the reader that she should prefer 
her ideal version of the marriage-free state 
to a marriage regime. 
Clare Chambers is University Senior 
Lecturer at Cambridge and a Fellow 
of Jesus College. Her latest book 
Against Marriage: An Egalitarian 
Defence of the Marriage-Free State will 
be published by Oxford University 
Press in July 2017. It is currently 
available for pre-order from the 
publishers and other booksellers. 
Clare was also interviewed about the 
‘State and Marriage’ on Philosophy 
24/7. The podcast is available at:  
www.philosophy247.org/podcasts/
marriage-state.
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Remembering Casimir Lewy 
On 10 February 2017 the Faculty held 
a memorial event at Trinity College  
in honour of Casimir Lewy. He was a 
Fellow at Trinity for more than 30 
years, and died in 1991 aged 71. 
Talks were given by emeritus 
professors Simon Blackburn and 
Edward Craig, and a number of his 
former students attended. Two of 
Lewy’s students share their memories 
of him below:
In 1975 I applied to read philosophy at 
Trinity College. I was making a mature 
student application and had no O or A 
levels nor any other qualifications (I was 
horribly dyslexic), so I believed my chances 
of getting a place were just about zero.  
To my surprise I was asked to attend an 
interview with Casimir Lewy.
I was extremely nervous during the 
interview, in no small part due to Casimir’s 
ability to reveal my patchy understanding 
of philosophy. I did not think I had made  
a good impression on him, but he did say  
I should go away and write an extended 
essay on a philosophical topic of my 
choosing.
Having spent a few months wading 
through the Tractatus, I said I would send 
him 25,000 words on it within two months. 
“Ha ha”, he said, gesturing towards me  
with a shaking hand, “Do you think you 
understand the Tractatus?” For some reason 
that I can only now put down to youthful 
ignorance, I replied “Yes, I think I do”. “Ooh 
good”, Casmir grinned back, “the College 
needs somebody who understands the 
Tractatus. Indeed, the world needs 
somebody who understands the Tractatus.”
I thought I had made a complete hash of 
the interview but nonetheless, I completed 
the essay and sent it to Casimir a few 
months later. Within a week I received  
a reply saying I had an unconditional  
offer of a place. As you might imagine, 
many people, especially academics and 
philosophers, find it hard to believe that  
a Fellow of Trinity College would offer a 
place to a hopeless dyslexic (long before  
it became fashionable) on the strength  
of a botched interview and one essay.
I have a feeling I was a slight 
disappointment to Casimir as I developed 
an interest in Continental philosophy. 
However, I pretty much got over that and 
went on to get a PhD on the philosophical 
problems of artificial intelligence research 
(again, long before it became fashionable). 
My gratitude to Casimir is perhaps greater 
than some, for he had more faith in me  
than I had in myself.
 Dr Keith H. Tayler (Trinity 1976)
I matriculated at Trinity College in 1982 and 
read Philosophy. Casimir Lewy was my first 
Director of Studies. I was a mature student 
and came up to Trinity at the age of 30 
years old. Prior to this I was a time-served 
Engineering Patternmaker having worked 
in the foundry industry and ‘on the bench’ 
for 12 years and had applied to Trinity whilst 
a student at Coleg Harlech where I was 
reading Philosophy and Psychology.
 I can remember my interview with 
Casimir Lewy very clearly. I was not alone,  
I am sure, by being bowled over by 
Cambridge, Trinity College’s Great Court, 
and the very thought of the possibility  
of being a student here, and it was in this 
state of reverence that I rapped on his door. 
“Come in!” he said with a gentle warbling 
voice, so I did, and he invited me in to sit 
near him. The conversation that followed 
surprised me in part, as it was clear towards 
the end of this interview that he had few 
doubts I would get a degree, but it was not 
this that concerned him. It was because  
I was a mature student and he wanted  
to know what my plans would be post-
Cambridge, were the offer to be made. I told 
him in all truthfulness that getting a degree 
had been a target for me for many years, 
and that achieving this would help lay to 
rest that almost visceral need I had had at 
the time. I said, if it meant I would return 
back to my Engineering roots, then so be it, 
but I knew I would be a different person. 
And so it was. I took the entrance exam, 
was offered a place at Trinity College and 
got my BA degree (a 2:1) in 1985. Then 
followed a PhD in Computer Science in 
1991, and a life in post-doctoral academic 
research in Artificial Intelligence, now 
spanning over 25 years. I will always have a 
debt of gratitude to Cambridge, the Faculty 
of Philosophy and of course Casimir Lewy 
for helping me on my way. 
 Dr David A. Randell (Trinity 1982)
Recordings of the talks given at this 
event are available from: http://sms.csx.
cam.ac.uk/collection/2419526. If you 
have a memory of Casimir Lewy to share 
we’d be delighted to hear from you!
Casimir Lewy.  Images courtesy of Trinity College 
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The meaning of religion
Tim Crane
Most philosophical discussions of religious 
belief focus on the question of its truth, and 
contemporary philosophers (in this country 
at least) have tended to press a rigorously 
atheist answer. The question of the meaning 
of religious belief, rather than its truth, is 
perhaps less discussed in recent analytic 
philosophy. But this question – what does it 
really mean to be a religious believer? – is 
surely as important as the question of truth.
Some may say this is not a philosophical 
question – and of course they are right that 
one cannot speculate about the nature of 
religious belief in a purely a priori manner. 
But we can speculate nonetheless, as many 
atheist philosophers and scientists have 
done, and the fact that our speculation 
should be constrained by the empirical facts 
does not stop it from being philosophical. 
And given the centrality of the 
phenomenon of religious belief in the world 
today, atheists should be interested in what 
it means as much as what (if any) of it is true.
Recent atheist discussions of religion  
have tended to treat it as if it were chiefly  
a theory of the universe, or a cosmology, 
combined with some moral precepts 
perhaps relating to life after death. Two 
things are hard to fit into this picture of 
religion: first, the fact that at the heart of 
most religion is a collection of practices 
(only one of the Five Pillars of Islam, for 
example, is a cosmological claim); and 
second, that religions essentially involve 
community with others – as Émile 
Durkheim put it, a religion is something  
that you belong to, not just something you 
believe. How should we incorporate these 
features into a full picture of religious belief?
In my forthcoming book, The Meaning of 
Belief, I try and answer this question, by 
returning to some classic works of writers 
like Durkheim and William James. I argue 
that although religions tend to involve an 
explicit cosmological element, this is not  
the totality of the religious world view.  
This world view should rather be seen as  
a combination of two attitudes. One is  
what I call the ‘religious impulse’, a sense of 
the transcendent, of there being more to it 
all than just this. The other is an attitude of 
identification with other people: belonging 
to a historical tradition, and making sense of 
the world through ritual and custom as an 
expression of this tradition. My claim is that 
the link between these two attitudes is 
given by the phenomenon of the sacred: 
sacred objects, words and rituals point 
towards a supposed transcendent reality, 
while in religious practices they also link 
believers to those in the past and present 
who share their belief. In my book I argue 
that these ideas form the basis of a more 
realistic picture of religious belief than that 
provided by many atheists.
 
The Meaning of Belief: Religion from  
an Atheist’s Point of View will be 
published by Harvard University  




What is it to think about something? 
This apparently simple question raises 
many issues. For example, it seems a 
truism that when someone thinks, there 
is something they are thinking about. 
But some of the things we think about 
exist and some don’t. Furthermore, 
there are truths and falsehoods about 
the non-existent things we think about. 
For example, it is true that Vulcan was 
postulated by Le Verrier, and false that  
it was postulated by Stephen Hawking. 
But this creates a puzzle, because 
Vulcan doesn’t exist, and so is not part 
of reality. How can there be truths about 
things that are not part of reality?
This problem is often discussed in 
linguistic or logical terms. For example, 
it’s often thought to be a problem 
specifically raised by non-referring 
names (e.g. ‘Vulcan’) or by how so-called 
negative existentials (e.g. ‘Vulcan does 
not exist’) can be true. But this linguistic 
and logical machinery can distract us 
from what’s really at issue. The real 
problem of non-existence is primarily 
about how the human capacity for 
thought enables us to think about 
things that don’t exist. 
This is an example of the approach 
of the New Directions in the Study  
of the Mind project, led by Tim Crane, 
and supported by The John Templeton 
Foundation. It has aimed to move 
beyond the logical and linguistic 
machinery that often dominates 
philosophical debates about the  
mind. We have instead concentrated 
on studying the mental phenomena  
of thought and consciousness 
themselves, and the role they play  
in our mental lives, in a creative 
reinterpretation of Husserl’s rallying 
cry, “Back to the things themselves!”.
So far, the project has involved two 
workshops, one on consciousness and 
one on intentionality, and a series of 
seminars. We still have some upcoming 
events taking place in Cambridge.  
Tim Crane will be giving a public 
lecture, Is the Mind a Physical Thing?,  
on 17th May, and our project’s capstone 
event, The Human Mind Conference, 
takes place 27th-29th June. Do come 
along! For more details, visit  
www.newdirectionsproject.com.
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Staff news
Professor Emerita, Onora O’Neill was 
awarded the Norwegian Holberg Prize for 
outstanding contributions to research in 
the arts and humanities for her influential 
role in ethical and political philosophy.
Prof Tim Crane gave the 2017 EJ Lowe 
lecture at the University of Durham  
and will give the Frege lectures in Tartu 
University, Estonia in June 2017. He recently 
appeared on the BBC Philosopher’s Arms 
programme in a discussion of whether  
Jaffa Cakes are cakes or biscuits. It is 
available here: www.bbc.co.uk/news/
magazine-38985820
Dr Arif Ahmed was promoted to Reader  
in philosophy.
Dr Tim Button was promoted to a Senior 
Lectureship. In January 2017 he gave a 
public lecture at the Royal Institute of 
Philosophy called ‘I disappear’. It is available 
at: https://youtu.be/sUMi6vkMnNs
Prof Rae Langton gave many talks 
including the Knox Lecture at St Andrews, 
the Kissel Lecture in Ethics at Harvard 
University, the Annual Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Lecture and the Mind 
Association Lecture in Cambridge.
Dr Clare Chambers became a Trustee  
of the charity Genital Autonomy, which 
campaigns against the unnecessary genital 
cutting of children. She is also a member  
of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
Working Party on Cosmetic Procedures, 
which is due to report this summer.
Angela Breitenbach gave a TEDx talk in 
May 2016 on ‘Can theories be beautiful?’.  
It is available from: https://youtu.be/
ZZE3m6wbccI.
Appointments
Dr Chris Cowie has a permanent 
Lectureship at Durham University starting 
in September 2017.  
Dr Sophia Connell has been appointed  
to a permanent Lectureship at Birkbeck 
College, London.
We are delighted that a number of our 
recent graduates have been appointed  
to academic posts. Nora Heinzelmann  
has been appointed to an assistant 
professorship at the Ludwig Maximilians 
University of Munich, Germany. Ali Boyle 
has been appointed as Junior Research 
Fellow at Trinity Hall. 
Georgie Statham has been appointed 
to a Polonsky Postdoctoral Fellowship,  
at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute.  
Lukas Skiba has been appointed to 
one-year Postdoc at the University of 
Hamburg. Shyane Siriwardena has  
a 2-year Postdoctoral Fellowship at the 
University of Leeds. Carlo Rossi has a 
2-year International Postdoctoral Research 
Fellowship at Cambridge; and Dan 
Brigham has been appointed as Teacher  
of Philosophy at St Paul’s School, London.
People Student Prizes
Joshua Gottlieb (St Edmund’s) was 
awarded the Matthew Buncombe 
prize for best overall achievement  
in the MPhil. The Craig Taylor prize  
for best performance in the Tripos 
went to Christopher Masterman 
(Peterhouse) for Part IB, and Jack 
Harding (Trinity) for Part II. 
The latest in Philosophy at Cambridge 
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Future Events
Routledge Lecture in Philosophy
26 May 2017
Prof Peter Singer (Princeton and 
Melbourne Universities) will give a 
public lecture on ‘The Point of View 
of the Universe: Defending Sidgwick’s 




Dr Clare Chambers will give a talk 
entitled ‘Should the state recognise 
marriage?’. Further details will be 
available from:  
www.alumni.cam.ac.uk. 
Cambridge Festival of Ideas 2017
16 October – 29 October 2017
Please see the Festival website:  
www.festivalofideas.cam.ac.uk  
for further details.
Information about other forthcoming 
events is available from the Faculty 
website: www.phil.cam.ac.uk/events.
